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7.
Private 1 However, there remain important but barely touched issues including the question of how the optimal communication strategy of a central bank depends on the nature of its decision-making process and the structure of its monetary policy committee (Blinder et al, 2008) . This paper attempts to …ll this gap by examining how di¤erent types of committee should optimally communicate. Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) distinguish between autocratically-collegial, genuinely-collegial, and individualistic committees. A committee in which the chairman more or less dictates the group consensus is autocratically-collegial. The chairman listens to the debate that forms part of the deliberation process and his decision may be in ‡uenced by the views of other committee members. However, he will eventually announce the group's consensus, expecting everyone else to fall in line. The Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan was often seen as such a committee. In an individualistic committee each member expresses his or her own opinion and the group decision is made by majority voting. Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) argue that the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank …t this description. Finally, a committee in which decisions are made by consensus is referred to as genuinely-collegial. The chairman in such a committee gets more public attention, but is not necessarily more in ‡uential than other members. The European Central Bank is often cited as representing such a committee although the Federal Reserve under Bernanke also seems to have moved in that direction. In a survey of 94 central banks, Fry et al. (2000) …nd that of the 79 that make decisions by committee only 36 do so through formal voting. The other 43 reach decisions by consensus.
The present paper provides a …rst attempt to analyze theoretically how the optimal communication strategy of a monetary policy committee depends on its decision-making process. The model assumes that committee members have di¤erent preferences regarding the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization that are unknown to the private sector. The public is learning about those preferences and the decision-making process of the committee in order to form an expectation of in ‡ation. The paper thus follows a number of earlier studies in investigating central bank communication in an environment of imperfect knowledge (e.g. Dale et al, 2008 and Berardi and Du¤y, 2007) .
In modelling the private sector as perpetually learning, it is shown that central bank communication has a signi…cant e¤ect on private sector expectations. Whether or not communication is welfare enhancing depends on the decision-making strategy of the committee. If committee members have heterogeneous preferences about the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization, it is preferable for decisions to be made by majority voting. Under majority voting, the public has to predict the preferences of the median policymaker and can ignore policymakers with variable preferences that are hard to predict. This leads to greater policy predictability, which is shown to be welfare enhancing. In addition, given a certain degree of private sector imperfect knowledge about the decision-making process of the committee, when committee members are heterogeneous, central bank communication is more likely to be welfare enhancing under majority voting than when decisions are made by consensus. However, under both majority voting and decision-making by consensus, if the public faces a signi…cant degree of imperfect knowledge about the decision-making process of the committee, then communication by the central bank committee leads to more variability in in ‡ation and the output gap and reduces welfare. In this case the public is unable to process and utilize the information communicated by the central bank e¤ectively. The results of this paper show furthermore that it is welfare enhancing when a chairman with stable policy preferences carries signi…cant weight in the policy decision-making process. The presence of such a chairman leads to greater predictability of committee preferences and thus improves the accuracy of private sector in ‡ation expectations.
The fact that central bank communication may not always be bene…cial has been well documented in the literature. In general, central bank communication enhances the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy by disseminating news and thereby moving short-term interest rates in a desired direction or by reducing noise and thereby lowering market uncertainty (Blinder et al, 2008) . Thus if communication is able to steer expectations successfully, policy decisions should become more predictable. Empirical studies show that the predictability of interest rate decisions of the major central banks has improved remarkably in recent years due to more transparency and a greater emphasis on central bank communication (Blinder et al, 2008) . However, poorly designed communication can also be harmful. As shown by Morris and Shin (2002) , public information might be undesirable if it crowds out private information. In their model, private agents have an incentive to match the underlying economic fundamentals about which they have both private and public information, and at the same time want to coordinate their actions with other agents. This coordination motive leads private agents to put more weight on the public signal than is justi…ed by its precision, thereby exacerbating volatility if the public signal is su¢ ciently noisy.
The …ndings of this paper also contribute to the emerging literature on the optimal design of monetary policy committees. When committee members are heterogeneous, it is shown that it is preferable for decisions to be made by majority voting. This …nding has been con…rmed by the literature. Gerlach-Kristen (2006) examines whether majority voting or averaging performs better in terms of choosing the correct policy instrument under uncertainty about the state of the economy. She shows that when policymakers have di¤erent abilities and thus the quality of their estimates of the state of the economy di¤ers, majority voting leads to better policy decisions. Furthermore, the results of the present paper demonstrate that an in ‡uential chairman is welfare enhancing. The previous empirical and theoretical literature has often argued that the chairman of the committee can exert disproportionate in ‡uence on the committee decision (Blinder, 2004) . In an empirical study on decision-making at the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, Chappell et al (2004) estimate that the impact of the chairman on policy decisions corresponds to a voting weight of 40 to 50 percent. As Gerlach-Kristen (2008) argues, this in ‡uence may come from the chairman's ability to in ‡uence the discussion and summarize the di¤erent views of committee members but it may also be the result of his superior monetary policy making skills or due to the institutional setup of the committee. Gerlach-Kristen (2008) simulates a simple model in which policymakers have di¤erent estimates of the optimal level of the interest rate. She …nds that the in ‡uence of the chairman on the quality of policy itself is limited and that the chairman's main impact is to help build consensus in the committee, which enhances the credibility of monetary policy. The present paper does not evaluate how an in ‡uential chairman a¤ects the quality of the policy decision under uncertainty about the state of the economy, but how an in ‡uential chairman enhances the predictability of policy decisions and thereby welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II. outlines the general model of the economy. Section III. introduces committee decision-making. Section IV. analyses private sector expectations given di¤erent communication strategies of the committee. Section V. presents the results whilst Section VI. concludes.
II. THE MODEL A. General Setup
In ‡ation is described by the expectations-augmented Phillips curve:
where t denotes in ‡ation, e t is the private sector expectation of time t in ‡ation and y t is the output gap de…ned as the di¤erence between actual and potential output, where the latter is conveniently normalized to zero. Furthermore t is an i.i.d. disturbance with properties t N (0;
2 ): For analytical convenience the coe¢ cients of the Phillips curve have been normalized to one. This does not a¤ect any of the qualitative results.
Similarly to Walsh (2007) , the transmission mechanism from the central bank's instrument to the output gap is modelled in the simplest way possible by assuming that the central bank is able to control the output gap perfectly so that the output gap, y t ; is equal to the policy instrument, x t .
It is assumed that the central bank minimizes a quadratic loss function of the form:
where ! denotes the central bank's weight on in ‡ation stabilization (0 < ! < 1) and and y denote the in ‡ation and output gap targets of the central bank respectively:
The central bank minimizes this loss function with respect to x t and subject to equation (1) taking private sector in ‡ation expectations as given and fully observing the aggregate supply shock. Thus policy is set under discretion. It can be shown that optimal policy is set as
This yields the intuitive result that the policy instrument is increasing in the central bank's in ‡ation and output gap targets and decreasing in private sector in ‡ation expectations and the aggregate supply shock.
The resulting level of in ‡ation is given as
In ‡ation is increasing in private sector in ‡ation expectations, the in ‡ation and output gap targets of the central bank and the aggregate supply shock.
Taking expectations of equation (4) gives the private sector's expected in ‡ation rate:
where it is assumed that the private sector does not observe the supply shock when it forms an expectation of in ‡ation. This yields the intuitive result that the private sector's expectation of in ‡ation is increasing in both the in ‡ation and output gap targets and decreasing in the preference for in ‡ation stabilization by the central bank if y > 0. Substituting equation (5) into equations (3) and (4), yields the equilibrium output gap and in ‡ation rate in this economy. The output gap is given by
and in ‡ation can be denoted as
Thus under rational expectations of the public, the output gap is solely determined by the aggregate supply shock and the preference for in ‡ation stabilization of the central bank. In ‡ation on the other hand is a positive function of both the in ‡ation and output gap targets of the central bank as well as the aggregate supply shock. Furthermore, in ‡ation is decreasing in the central bank's preference for in ‡ation versus output gap stabilization if y > 0:
B. Uncertainty About The Central Bank' s Preferences
Following Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2007) , uncertainty about the central bank's in ‡ation stabilization preference is introduced to illustrate that welfare is decreasing in the variance of the public's estimate of !. The public's best estimate of the central banks'preference for in ‡ation stabilization is assumed to be on average correct and is given by b ! = ! + , where is i.i.d. with variance 2 . Thus the expectation of in ‡ation of the private sector becomes
The private sector in ‡ation expectation is still a positive function of the in ‡ation and output gap targets of the central bank, which continue to be perfectly known. However, it is now a negative function of the public's best estimate of the central bank's in ‡ation stabilization preference. Substituting equation (8) into equations (3) and (4), yields the resulting output gap and in ‡ation rate. The output gap can be written as
whilst in ‡ation is given by
Thus in ‡ation and the output gap are a function of both the true preference for in ‡ation stabilization by the central bank and the public's best estimate of this preference. It is straightforward to show that expected in ‡ation and the expected output gap are equal to in ‡ation and the output gap under certainty about the in ‡ation stabilization preference of the central bank, namely equations (6) and (7). The variance of the output gap can be linearly approximated by a Taylor series expansion 2 :
It can easily be veri…ed that this variability is minimized for 2 = 0. The variance of in ‡ation can also be approximated by a Taylor series expansion:
The variability of in ‡ation is increasing in the variance of the private sector's estimate of the central bank's in ‡ation stabilization preference, 2 . Hence, the variance of in ‡ation is minimized for 2 = 0: This result is con…rmed by Beetsma and Jensen (2003) who show that preference uncertainty increases the variability of in ‡ation and output and thus is not desirable.
Therefore, welfare in this setup is enhanced, when the in ‡ation stabilization preference of the central bank is known. In this case, output gap variability is reduced to V ar(y t ) = ! 2 2 and in ‡ation variability to (1 !) 2 2 : When 2 = 0, there is no asymmetric information between the central bank and the public about ! and there is perfect transparency about the central bank's preferences. This is an important result as in the subsequent analysis, the paper assesses how di¤erent communication practices and institutional setups of the central bank committee in ‡uence the predictability of preferences of the monetary policy committee.
III. MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE DECISION-MAKING

A. The Preferences Of Committee Members
It is assumed that the committee consists of N members, in addition to the chairman. For simplicity, the only source of heterogeneity between committee members are di¤erent preferences about the weight that should be given to in ‡ation and output gap stabilization. Blinder (2007) argues that policymakers are very likely to have di¤erent preferences in that some (the "hawks") may be far more concerned with in ‡ation while others (the "doves") put more weight on output. Hence committee member j 0 s loss function can be written as
2 This uses the result that the linear approximation via a Taylor series expansion gives the approximate variance for 1=X where X denotes a random variable as: V ar
Committee member j 0 s preference for in ‡ation stabilization is given by
It is assumed that jt follows an autoregressive process of order 1. Thus
where " jt N (0; 2 ";j ) and 0 < j < 1 for j = 1; :::; N + 1: For each committee member j; " jt is uncorrelated with the aggregate supply shock, t . Furthermore, the innovations to jt are assumed to be uncorrelated across members. Thus, the mean preference is identical among policymakers and given by !: However the variance of preferences di¤ers among committee members. For committee member j this variance is given by V ar(! jt ) = 2 ";j 1 2 j : Whilst preferences are not constant over time there exists some inertia in committee members'preferences. The assumption about inertia in members' preferences is similar to that made by Faust and Svensson (2002) , who assume that the output target of the central bank follows an AR(1) process. It can be justi…ed by arguing that it is unlikely for members'preferences to change completely every period and that even if a member is replaced, it is likely that his successor has similar preferences if he is appointed by the same government. As Cukierman (2007) argues, it is also very unlikely that the in ‡ation and output gap stabilization preference of committee members will stay constant over time. This paper abstracts from uncertainty about the state of the economy to simplify the mathematical analysis whereas in reality policymakers very likely to only imperfectly observe the current output gap and in ‡ation rate. In this case they will be unwilling to make a long-term commitment to a weight attached to a highly unreliable measure.
B. Timing
The timing in any period t is as follows: First, policy preferences of committee members are realized. Each committee member observes his own preference but preferences are unknown to the public. Second, the committee may or may not communicate with the public in the form of speeches. These speeches imperfectly reveal committee members'preferences for that particular period. The private sector then forms an expectation of the aggregated weight given to in ‡ation stabilization by the central bank and thus an expectation of in ‡ation. Subsequently, the aggregate supply shock is realized and observed by both the public and the central bank. Having observed both the aggregate supply shock and private sector expectations, the central bank sets the policy instrument. How this instrument is set will depend on the decision-making procedure of the committee. Finally, the minutes and voting records of the policy meeting are published and these perfectly convey the preference of each committee member in period t 3 .
C. The Policy Decision
The determination of policy will depend on the decision-making process of the committee. If the committee decides by consensus, the policy rate is assumed to be a function of the average of desired instrument rates. If the committee is individualistic and votes by majority, the policy rate is a function of the median of the desired instrument rates by committee members. In addition, the chairman may have added in ‡uence. In what follows, decision-making by consensus will …rst be evaluated. The section will then turn to the case of an individualistic committee. In both cases, the chairman may have added in ‡uence.
C.1 Decision-making by consensus
Using equation (3) and given di¤erent preferences of policymakers regarding the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization, the desired policy instrument of each committee member is given by
Thus the desired policy instrument of member j will be a function of his or her preferences for the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization. It is assumed that the policy instrument if decisions are made by consensus is a function of the mean of the di¤erent desired policy instruments:
where t has zero mean and variance,
2
;t : The separate term added for the chairman re ‡ects the fact that he may have added in ‡uence (c 2 > 0). The paper models committee decision-making following the econometric models of Chappell et al (2004) . If decision-making follows a consensual pattern, one would expect that the adopted policy directive broadly re ‡ects the views of all committee members. Thus, the committee decision is assumed to be a function of the mean of members'preferences. This of course oversimpli…es complexity. In reality, for instance in the case of the European Central Bank, where decisions are made by consensus, no outside observer really knows the precise meaning of 'consensus'. Thus, our simple model is at best an approximation of the very complex process of decision-making by committee. The reason that monetary policy is speci…ed as some function of the mean of preferences and not as just the mean is the belief that there will always be some other factors in ‡uencing the committee decision during the meeting and the deliberation process, which are part of the error term and di¢ cult to formalize.
The paper also abstracts from strategic voting. It is also assumed that the chairman does not vote so as always to be on the 'winning side'but that minutes and voting records reveal his preferences. The paper furthermore ignores the e¤ects that transparency about policy deliberations could have on the behavior of committee members. Incentive e¤ects, whereby committee members adjust their behavior according to which information is disclosed, may also play an important role for the question of the desirability of publishing voting records and minutes. Whilst there is a growing game-theoretic literature on strategic behavior in committees 4 , policymakers themselves do not believe that such considerations play an important role in policy meetings. For instance, Yellen (2005) claims that 'in fact, I think FOMC members behave far less individualistically and strategically than assumed in some of these models'.
It is straightforward to rewrite equation (15) as
Thus the desired policy instrument by the committee is a function of the mean of the di¤erent weights given to in ‡ation stabilization by committee members. If the restriction that c 1 + c 2 = 1 is imposed, the aggregated committee preference can be de…ned as follows
The error term t is assumed to be i.i.d with zero mean and variance 2 . 5 The domain of its normal distribution is truncated to the interval [a; a], where a is such that 0 < ! C t < 1 6 . Thus it is assumed that the central bank committee is not a strict 4 An extensive overview of this literature and its relevance for monetary policy committees has been provided by Gerling et al (2003) . 5 In order for 17 to be derived exactly from 15, t = t ( t t y ) and thus its variance is not independent of time. 6 In simulations, any observations of the aggregated committee preference that do not lie between 0 and 1 are discarded. Values of t are randomly drawn until the desired number of aggregated committee in ‡ation targeter. This seems a reasonable assumption in practice, because the central banks of most developed economies act as ‡exible in ‡ation targeters whether they explicitly target in ‡ation or not (Cukierman, 2007) . This aggregated preference can alternatively be written as 
and thus
; where e C t is a composite error term with zero mean and variance
The expectation of the aggregated preference will thus be equal to the mean preference of committee members, !. The desired instrument set by the committee is given by
The policy instrument set by the committee is thus a function of the aggregated preference of the committee for the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization as well as the in ‡ation and output gap targets, the expected in ‡ation by the public and the aggregate supply shock. Given this instrument set by the committee, in ‡ation equals
Therefore, in ‡ation depends on the private sector in ‡ation expectation, the instrument set by the committee and the aggregate supply shock.
C.2 Individualistic decision-making
If decisions are made by majority voting, the aggregated preference for the policy instrument will be given as a function of the median of the di¤erent desired policy instruments:
where & t has zero mean and variance
As in the consensus case, this is equivalent to expressing the committee preference for the policy instrument as x given by 
:
In ‡ation under individualistic decision-making equals
IV. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The public is aware of the general form of the reaction function of each committee member and also knows whether the committee sets the policy instrument by consensus or majority rule. However, private agents do not know the preferences of committee members regarding the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization and only know the average preference of each member, that is !. The private sector furthermore does not know the parameters in equations (17) and (23). The public hence has to estimate the parameters just like an econometrician would do. This is the adaptive learning approach to expectations in macroeconomics. As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point out this viewpoint introduces a speci…c form of 'bounded rationality'. Economic agents have limited common knowledge since they estimate their own perceived laws of motion by making forecasts of the economy using their own estimates of parameters (Evans and Honkapohja, 2008) . This paper follows a number of earlier studies (Orphanides and Williams (2005) , Dale et al (2008) ) in modelling learning as perpetual and assumes that agents estimate model parameters by constant gain least squares (CGLS). Let y t denote the dependent variable at time t, whereas x t denotes a kx1 vector of independent variables including a constant and c t denotes a kx1 coe¢ cient vector. Then c t can be updated recursively over time using the following formulae:
and
where R t denotes the moment matrix for x t and 0 < < 1.
Constant gain learning implies that more recent observations are given a higher weight 7 . A natural way to motivate this is to assume that agents are concerned about the possibility of structural change (Evans and Honkapohja, 2008) . Empirical studies for the US and Europe show that constant gain least squares learning provides an accurate description of forecaster behavior (Branch and Evans, 2006 , Pfajfar and Santoro, 2006 , Weber, 2010 . Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that constant gain least squares learning di¤ers in small but persistent ways from full rationality and that there is generally no convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium.
In what follows, private sector learning will be evaluated for di¤erent communication strategies of the committee. Section A. analyses what happens when the committee is completely opaque. Section B. investigates the formation of private sector in ‡ation expectations when only voting records and minutes of policy meetings are published. Finally, Section C. will consider the case in which committee members also communicate with the private sector through speeches before committee meetings.
A. Complete Opacity By Committee Members
If only the interest rate decision of the committee is published, the private sector uses the mean preference of committee members, !, as a best estimate of committee members'preferences. Alternatively the past policy decision of the committee could be used as the best prediction of future instrument rates. However, if there is not much inertia in committee members'preferences and the variances of the shocks to the preference aggregations, V ar( t ) and V ar( t ); are su¢ ciently large, this leads to less predictability of the aggregated committee preference compared to using the mean preference, !. This can easily illustrated for the case when N = 1. Using equations (12), (13) and (18), it can be shown that when decisions are made by consensus:
It is straightforward to show that
7 If the constant gain is denoted by ; then this gain implies that economic agents use (1= )=f years of data, where f denotes the data frequency: f = 1 for yearly and f = 4 for quarterly data for example.
The above inequality will hold as long as 1 is not large and V ar( t ) is of su¢ cient magnitude. The same can be shown for individualistic decision-making when N = 1 8 .
When the private sector uses the mean preference, !; as the best estimate for the aggregated committee preference, it forms the following in ‡ation expectation for period t :
Substituting the private sector's expectation into equations (19) and (22), gives the resulting output gap under both a consensus based and individualistic approach to decision-making:
where k = C; M . This takes into account the di¤erent decision-making procedures of the committee, namely a consensus based approach where k = C and an individualistic approach to decision-making where k = M:
Similarly substituting equations (27) and (28) into equations (20) and (24) yields the resulting in ‡ation rate under both a consensus based and individualistic approach to decision-making:
where k = C; M .
The variance of output can be linearly approximated via a Taylor series expansion as V ar(y t )
under both a consensus based and individualistic approach to decision-making.
9 Furthermore, it can be shown that
To minimize those variances, it is optimal for ! equal ! k t :
B. Voting Records And Policy Minutes Published
If voting records and minutes of the committee meeting are published in period t 1, the private sector can infer the preferences of each committee member for that period.
8 When decisions are made by a consensus approach, it is straightforward to …nd more general expressions for
2 and E t (! C t !) 2 for N > 1 and c 1 = 1: It can be shown that the former exceeds the latter as long as
(1 2 2 ) + :::
9 Where a linear approximation via a Taylor series expansion was used that gives the approximate of two independent random variables X and Y as:
The public's forecast of committee member j 0 s preferences for period t will be
for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1. The N + 1th member denotes the public's prediction of the chairman's preference.
The public's prediction for the committee's aggregated weight given to in ‡ation stabilization in period t when decisions are made by consensus, will be as follows: 
where b c 1;t 1 and b c 2;t 1 are the estimates by the public of the coe¢ cients in equation (17). This can be rewritten as
; 2 2;t 1;:::; N N;t 1 ; CH CH;t 1 ] + b c 2;t 1 ( CH CH;t 1 ): (32) Thus the public's estimate of the aggregated weight given to in ‡ation stabilization is equal to ! P;C tpt 1 = ! + e P;C t where e P;C t has zero mean and the variance is given by The private sector estimates b c 1;t 1 and b c 2;t 1 in period t using the true preferences of committee members up to period t 1 as the independent variables and the aggregated committee preference up to period t 1 as the dependent variable. The aggregated committee preference in period t 1 is learnt by the private sector once the committee decision and the true supply shock in period t 1 become known at the end of the period. Using equations (25) and (26) when committee decisions are made by consensus, the updating process for these coe¢ cient estimates is as follows
where b c t = (b c 1;t ; b c 2;t ) 0 and the variables X C;t 1 are given by 
whilst R C;t 1 evolves according to the following recursive equation:
Thus the larger the di¤erence between the best prediction for the aggregated committee preference formed for t 1 and the actual aggregated preference by the committee, the more will the previous coe¢ cient estimates be revised by the public.
When decisions are made by majority voting, the best estimate of the public for the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization by the committee will be given by When decisions are made by majority, the estimates of the coe¢ cients in equation (23) can similarly to above be written as
where b m t = ( b m 1;t ; b m 2;t ) 0 and X M;t 1 is de…ned as 
and R M;t 1 evolves as follows over time:
From the de…nition of constant gain learning and the updating processes of the coe¢ cient estimates, (33), (35), (37) and (39), it can be seen that the smaller , the larger is the number of data points that are being used by the public. Thus the quality of the coe¢ cient estimates will be decreasing in the size of the constant gain. Therefore, the larger is ; the more limited is the public in its ability to evaluate information e¢ ciently and the greater is the public's degree of imperfect knowledge of the coe¢ cients of equations (17) and (23).
The public's expectation of in ‡ation in period t can be written as
for k = C; M: This takes into account the consensus based approach to decision-making where k = C and the individualistic approach to decision-making where k = M:
Substituting the private sector's expectation into (19) and (22), gives the resulting output gap under both a consensus based and individualistic approach to decision-making:
for k = C; M: Furthermore substituting (40) and (41) into (20) and (24) yields the resulting in ‡ation rate under consensus and majority voting:
for k = C; M: It can be seen that the output gap is minimized when ! P;k tpt 1 is equal to ! k t ; that is when the aggregated committee preferences are fully predictable. Thus predictability in our model leads to less ‡uctuations in output. The variances of the output gap and in ‡ation can be linearly approximated via a Taylor series expansion 10 :
V ar(y t ) (y )
C. Imperfect Communication Of Preferences
Committee members can communicate their preferences to the public imperfectly before the policy decision is made in the form of speeches. The private sector receives the following signals on committee members'preferences:
where j;t is i.i.d. with variance 2 ;j for j = 1; :::; N + 1. The private sector can use these signals and combine them with the prediction of committee members'preferences formed from the publication of voting records and policy minutes in the previous period. We will …rst analyze a situation in which the private sector is already aware of the precision of these signals before considering perpetual learning about the variances of this public information. 10 The linear approximation via a Taylor series expansion gives the approximate variance of (Y =X) where Y and X are random variables as:
C.1 No uncertainty about the precision of public information
In this case the public will face a Kalman …ltering problem with
as the state equation and !;j;t = ! + jt + j;t
as the observation equation for each committee member, j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1. The public is assumed to know the variances of both the state and the observation equation.
The solution to the signal extraction problem is 11 :
for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1: Thus, the more precise the information provided before the policy meeting is, the more weight the private sector will optimally attach to it.
Given those estimates of committee members'preferences, the private sector can form in ‡ation expectations using the same methods as in Section IV.B.
C.2 Imperfect knowledge of the precision of public information
The assumption that the public knows the precision of the public signals is now relaxed and thus the value of the signal extraction parameter, 2 ";j 2 ";j + 2 ;j ; becomes unknown. If its unknown value is denoted by j , then the estimate of the public for member j 0 s preference for in ‡ation stabilization in period t is
for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1: The weights, j ; have to be determined by the relative historical forecasting performances of the prediction based on the state equation, ! jtpt 1 ; and the signal on committee members'preferences, !;j;t . The better !;j;t performs in predicting ! jtpt in every period, the larger will be jt : Let e 1t denote the forecast error of using ! jtpt 1 to predict ! jt : Thus, e 1t = ! jt ! jtpt 1 : Similarly, the forecast error when using the public signal on preferences can be written as e 2t = ! jt !;j;t : The error of the combined forecast, ! jtpt ; equals t = ! jt ! jtpt = e 1t + j (e 2t e 1t )
Rearranging the above expression gives
where the composite error term is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with zero mean and variance 2 :
This paper assumes that the private sector is perpetually learning about the economy. Thus, rather than using …xed weights for the above forecast combination, the private sector updates the weights each period as proposed by Diebold and Pauly (1987) . At the beginning of period t, the private sector has observed the true individual preferences of members in period t 1; ! jt 1 ; as well as the signals communicated by committee members at the beginning of period t 1 and it knows its own prediction of preferences using information from period t 2; that is ! jt 1pt 2 : The private sector recursively establishes jt by running the regression:
where
In every period t; the private sector then sets jt = b g jt 1 for 0 b g jt 1 1 and jt = 0 for b g jt < 0 and jt = 1 for b g jt 1 > 1 in order to make sure that 0
Again, it can be noted that the larger , the fewer observations will be used by the public to estimate the precision of public information and thus the worse will the estimates of this precision be. In what follows, it will be argued that the larger , the more limited the public is in its ability to evaluate the precision of public information and thus the greater the degree of the public's imperfect knowledge.
In order to form in ‡ation expectations, the private sector can make use of its di¤erent estimates of the preferences of member j, namely ! jtpt ; using the same methods as in Section IV.B.
V. RESULTS
Section V.A. starts by exploring the simple case in which the private sector is fully rational and knows the parameters of equations (17) and (23) 12 . This limiting case serves as a benchmark against which to consider the impact of imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality of the private sector. Section V.B. then investigates welfare under di¤erent institutional setups and communication strategies of the committee under the assumption that the public is perpetually learning.
In all the simulations, the error term of the Phillips curve has variance 2 = 1: In addition, 2 = 2 = 1: Furthermore, and y are set equal to 2. The model in this paper is highly stylized and as such the quantitative results are likely to depend on the parameter speci…cations. To illustrate this sensitivity and to assess the robustness of the qualitative results of the paper, the simulations are performed with di¤erent values for key parameters that are of economic interest and the results are shown in Section VI.
The e¤ectiveness of communication is measured in terms of the accuracy of private sector expectations of the aggregated committee preference evaluated by their root mean squared error (RMSE). The more precise the private sector is in predicting the aggregated committee preference, the smaller is the root mean squared error of private sector in ‡ation expectations 13 . When the public engages in perpetual learning, the economy is simulated over 160000 time periods. However, the …rst 80000 observations are discarded and the results are based on the second half of the sample and hence should not depend on the starting values used for the simulations. This procedure follows Dale et al (2008) .
A. Perfect Knowledge Benchmark
When the committee is opaque, the private sector uses the mean preference of each committee member for in ‡ation stabilization, !. The expected squared deviation of this 12 This assumption can be justi…ed as a fully rational public is able to estimate the relevant parameters and variances using recursive least squares and thus estimates of the parameters will eventually converge to their rational expectations values (for more details on the RLS algorithm and the convergence of estimates the their rational expectations values, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) ). 13 The accuracy of private sector expectations of in ‡ation is given by E t (
2 for k = C; M denoting both a consensus based and individualistic approach to decisionmaking and where b ! k estimate from the true preferences of committee members is given by
for j = 1; :::; N + 1:
If voting records and policy minutes are published in period t 1, the public's best prediction of committee member j's preference for in ‡ation stabilization in period t will be:
for j = 1; :::; N + 1 . The expected squared deviation of these estimates from the true preferences of committee members can be written as
Since 0 < j < 1; the private sector's estimate of member j 0 s preference for in ‡ation stabilization is more precise when voting records and minutes are published compared to the case when they are not published.
Furthermore, if the private sector is fully rational and able to process information e¢ ciently, imperfect communication about committee members'preferences through speeches is always enhancing the predictability of members'preferences. It is straightforward to show that:
as long as If the publication of voting records and policy minutes and speeches enables the private sector to predict more accurately the preferences of each committee member, then it follows that this has to be true of any function of the estimates of committee members' preferences by the public, such as the mean or median. Thus if decisions are made by consensus it directly follows that for a given N;
where ! t denotes the vector of true preferences for j = 1; 2; ::; N + 1 (including the chairman), and ! tpt denotes the vector of predicted preferences when policy minutes and speeches are published. Similarly, ! tpt 1 denotes the vector of predicted preferences when only minutes are published.
If decisions are made by a committee with an individualistic approach to decision-making, it can be deduced that for a given N;
Again ! t denotes the vector of true preferences for j = 1; 2; ::; N + 1 (including the chairman), and ! tpt denotes the vector of predicted preferences when voting records and speeches are published. Similarly, ! tpt 1 denotes the vector of predicted preferences when only voting records are published. These results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 When the private sector does not face imperfect knowledge, it will always be bene…cial to publish minutes and voting records of committee meetings. Policy minutes and voting records in this case perfectly reveal to the private sector the preferences of committee members for that period and can then be used to predict preferences in the next period. In addition, speeches by committee members before policy meetings enhance the predictability of preferences and thus welfare.
It is also interesting to consider whether the predictability of preferences and thus in ‡ation depends on the decision-making strategy of the committee. When only voting records and policy minutes are published, the expected squared deviation of the prediction of the mean preference (excluding the chairman) by the public from the true average preference of the committee can be expressed as
and for the median preference as
= E t median(! + 1 1;t 1 ; ! + 2 2;t 1 ; :::; ! + N N;t 1 ) median(! + 1;t ; ! + 2;t ; :::; ! + N;t )
Which one of the above expressions is smaller depends on the number of committee members and how heterogeneous committee members are regarding the variances of the error terms in the AR(1) process governing their preferences, that is 2 ";j : In what follows, the paper will refer to policymakers that share the same variance of the error term in the AR(1) process governing their preferences, as 'homogeneous'. Strictly speaking, these policymakers still have heterogeneous preferences that feature the same 2 ";j :
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows that when the variances of the AR(1) processes governing committee members preferences are identical and equal to 1, making decisions by simple averaging is clearly preferable to making decision by majority voting. In addition, predictability under both a consensus based and individualistic approach to decision-making is increasing with committee size (for N > 2). The intuition for these results is as follows. When the variances of the AR(1) process governing committee preferences are identical, then the preference of each committee member is equally predictable. Attaching the same weight to all predictions of members'preferences is optimal. Moreover, as N increases, predictability of preferences increases. This is because as N increases the preference of each policymaker will carry less weight under averaging. This can be easily seen for consensus based decision making from equation (56) On the other hand, Figure 2 illustrates the RMSE of the public, when the variances of the AR(1) process governing preferences are di¤erent in that " jt N (0; 1) for j = 2:::; N and " 1t N (0; 8). This …gure shows that making decisions by majority voting yields higher predictability of preferences in this case. The di¤erence in predictability under majority voting and decision-making by consensus is shown to be decreasing with committee size when members are heterogeneous. The intuition for these results is as follows. Under majority voting the public has to predict the preferences of the median policymaker and thus can ignore policymakers with very large variances, whose preferences are hard to predict. Thus, if the variances of preferences of committee members are diverse, then using majority voting will lead to greater predictability of preferences. In addition, as N increases, policymakers with high variances and whose preferences thus change by a large amount each period are given less weight under averaging, which improves predictability.
In …gures 1 and 2 the result for the RMSEs for di¤erent committee sizes under voting are non-monotonic. In this case, preferences are aggregated using the median. This is a more complex aggregating procedure than averaging, and from (57) it can be seen that the median of the predicted members'preferences might not correspond to the preference of the median committee member. The fact that in this case, the results are less smooth than under averaging was also demonstrated by Gerlach-Kristen (2006) . Gerlach-Kristen (2006) examines whether voting or averaging performs better in terms of choosing the correct policy instrument under uncertainty about the state of the economy. She …nds that if policymakers'skills are identical, averaging outperforms voting. However, if policymakers have di¤erent abilities, majority voting leads to a monetary policy that is closer to the optimal monetary policy that would be conducted if there was no uncertainty about the economy. Our results do not investigate which decision-making process leads to better monetary policy but which decision rule leads to greater predictability of preferences and thus welfare. However, the results are similar in that greater heterogeneity between policymakers (be it about abilities or preferences) makes decision-making by majority more desirable.
B. Private Sector Imperfect Knowledge
The section …rst discusses the simulation results when the central bank communicates only its voting records and policy minutes and when the chairman has no particular in ‡uence. The section then analyses welfare when the chairman has added in ‡uence. Finally, the section considers the case in which the central bank publishes its voting records and policy minutes and communicates through speeches before policy meetings.
B.1 Voting records and policy minutes are published
The e¤ect of publishing voting records and policy minutes under di¤erent constant gains of the public on the predictability of the aggregated committee preference for the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization is shown in Figures 3 and 4 . Those …gures show the constant gain, which the public uses to learn about the parameters of the processes governing policymakers'preferences, (17) and (23), and the corresponding RMSE of the public in predicting the aggregated preference of the committee for in ‡ation stabilization. In both …gures, N is set equal to 9 and j is equal to 0:5 for j = 1; 2; ::; N + 1: Furthermore, in Figure 3 , " jt N (0; 1) for j = 2; 3; :::; N + 1 and " 1t N (0; 0:1) whereas in Figure 4 , " jt N (0; 1) for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1: The coe¢ cients c 1 and m 1 are set to 1.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that as the constant gain increases, the public uses less historical data to estimate the relevant model parameters and hence the quality of the prediction of the aggregated committee preference for the weight given to in ‡ation stabilization decreases. By way of comparison, the RMSE of the public when the central bank does not publish its voting records or policy minutes is shown by the horizontal line. If there is no communication by the committee, the public will simply use the mean preference of committee members, !, as the best estimate of the aggregated committee preference.
For both consensus based decision-making and majority voting, when the private sector gain is low, the predictability of the aggregated committee preference is increased when policy minutes and voting records are published. However as Figure 3 illustrates, when policymakers are heterogeneous in their preferences, an individualistic approach to decision-making leads to greater predictability and this means that the constant gain beyond which central bank communication becomes suboptimal is larger than for a consensus based approach. Figure 4 shows that the opposite applies when policymakers are homogeneous in terms of their policy preferences.
The intuition for these results is as follows. The public learns about the coe¢ cients of the process that aggregates the di¤erent preferences of committee members, that is (17) and (23). The lower is the constant gain that the public uses in order to form estimates of the coe¢ cients, the more precise those estimates will be. This is because the smaller is the more observations the public uses to form these estimates. Thus, when is small, the public is able to use the information contained in minutes and voting records relatively e¢ ciently leading to better predictions of the aggregated committee preference than using the mean preference, !: In addition, the results of Section A. regarding the desirability of majority voting versus consensus continue to hold, in that if policymakers are heterogeneous, majority voting is preferable. This is because, in this case, the private sector needs to predict the policy preference of the median member and can ignore policymakers whose preferences are very variable and di¢ cult to predict.
B.2 A chairman with added in ‡uence
It is often argued that the chairman can exert disproportionate in ‡uence on the committee decision (Blinder, 2004) . In an empirical study on decision-making at the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, Chappell et al (2004) estimate that the impact of the chairman on policy decisions corresponds to a voting weight of 40 to 50 percent. As Gerlach-Kristen (2008a) argues, this in ‡uence may come from the chairman's ability to in ‡uence the discussion and summarize the di¤erent views of committee members but it may also be the result of superior monetary policy making skills or due to the institutional setup of the committee.
The results for a consensus based approach to decision-making are shown in Figure 5 and for an individualistic approach to decision-making in Figure 6 . In Figures 5 and 6 , N = 9; j = 0:5 for j = 1; 2; ::; N + 1: Furthermore, " jt N (0; 1) for j = 1; 2; :::; N and " N +1t N (0; 0:1). When the chairman has added in ‡uence c 1 and m 1 are set to 0.6 and c 2 and m 2 are set to 0.4. If all committee members have the same weight in the policy decision, then c 1 and m 1 are set to 1. Figures 5 and 6 show that if the chairman has stable policy preferences having a chairman with added in ‡uence is bene…cial. The presence of such a chairman enhances the overall predictability of the aggregated policy preference under both consensus and an individualistic approach to decision-making. In addition, the constant gain beyond which it becomes suboptimal to publish voting records and policy minutes is higher than without the presence of such a chairman.
The intuition for these results is as follows. If the policy preference of the chairman are very predictable, then the public is able to predict his voting behavior well from past voting records. Thus if he has a signi…cant in ‡uence on the policy decision, this enhances the predictability of the aggregated committee preference. Because, the RMSE of the public under private sector learning is generally smaller when an in ‡uential chairman whose preferences are predictable is present, central bank communication remains optimal for higher constant gains of the public.
The results of this paper may provide some explanation for the diverse communication practices of three major central banks, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England release minutes along with individual votes. The European Central Bank on the other hand does not publish minutes. If policymakers are heterogeneous in their preferences, then it is more likely that the publication of individual votes will be welfare enhancing when decisions are made by majority voting as it is the case at the Bank of England than when decisions are made by consensus, as it is the case at the ECB. Furthermore, if the chairman is very stable in his preferences and carries signi…cant weight, then this makes the publication of minutes and voting records more likely to be welfare enhancing. This may provide some explanation for why the Federal Reserve publishes minutes and individual votes since it is often argued that the chairman has signi…cant in ‡uence on the decision-making process.
The results also provide some explanation for empirical …ndings, which generally show that transparency about policy deliberations in the form of voting records and minutes are scarce. For example, Geraats (2009) Figure 7 shows the RMSE of the public under imperfect common knowledge of the precision of public information for a committee that makes decisions by majority. In this …gure, N = 9 and j = 0:5 for j = 1; 2; ::; N + 1: Furthermore, " jt N (0; 1) for j = 2; 3; :::; N + 1 and " 1t N (0; 0:1). The coe¢ cients c 1 and m 1 are set to 1. Figure 7 shows that when committee members give speeches that imperfectly reveal their preferences, the public may not be able to attach a correct weight to this additional information, resulting in less predictability of preferences. Figure 7 also illustrates that the constant gain beyond which it becomes suboptimal to communicate with the markets prior to the committee meeting in addition to publishing voting records is smaller than the constant gain beyond which it is suboptimal to publish voting records.
B.3 Voting records and speeches are published
The intuition for these results is as follows. If the committee only publishes its voting records, then in order to predict the aggregated committee preference, the public only needs to learn about the coe¢ cients in equations (17) and (23). If committee members in addition to voting records also communicate noisy information on their preferences before the committee meeting, then the private sector has to learn about the weights that it should attach to the these two sources of information on members'preferences. Thus, when there are two sources of public information, there are two di¤erent learning processes by the public. If is su¢ ciently small, then the predictability of the aggregated committee preference is enhanced by noisy communication of preferences through speeches and the publication of voting records because the private sector is able to process this information relatively e¢ ciently. As increases, both the quality of the estimates of the variances of the public information and the estimates of the coe¢ cients in equations (17) and (23) decreases. The interaction of those learning processes implies that the RMSE of the public rises by more as increases if there is communication in the form of speeches prior to meetings compared to the case when only voting records are published.
These results illustrate that the release of vague information by the central bank can be welfare reducing. If there are limits to how much information the public can digest e¤ectively, some communication might still be useful but the central bank has to be careful not to confuse the markets with extra communication that they cannot e¢ ciently process. The results correspond to the …ndings of Dale et al (2008) who conclude that the usefulness of communication depends on the public's ability to assess the quality of the central bank's communication. They are also related to the results by Morris and Shin (2002) who show that communication by the central bank could generate lower welfare when agents overreact to the public signal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recently there has been a growing interest in the communication strategies of central banks. This paper provides a …rst attempt to analyze how the optimal communication strategy of a central bank depends on the nature of its decision-making process and the structure of its monetary policy committee, a question that has been barely touched on in the existing literature on central bank communication.
The paper considers the optimal communication strategies of committees with di¤erent decision-making structures in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to communication if the public is boundedly rational. In addition, when committee members are heterogeneous, welfare is greater under majority voting than under a consensus based approach to decision-making. Furthermore with the public engaged in perpetual learning, when committee members are heterogeneous, central bank communication is more likely to be welfare enhancing under majority voting. However, under both majority voting and a consensus based approach to decision-making, if the public faces a signi…cant degree of imperfect knowledge due to uncertainty about the preference aggregation process of the committee and the precision of public information, then communication by the central bank reduces welfare. Furthermore, a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries signi…cant weight in the policy decision-making process is welfare-enhancing.
The model presented is highly stylized. However, it does provide some rationale for why monetary policy committees with di¤erent structures and institutional setups should communicate di¤erently and why central banks may want to be careful when communicating noisy information to the public. Some useful directions for future research should also be noted. This paper does not consider strategic behavior of committee members. However, it is plausible that with di¤erent policy preferences, coalitions among policymakers are formed. In addition, the paper abstracts from any political pressures on committee members, which may also a¤ect the voting behavior of committee members and hence the decision-making process of the committee. These issues are left to be explored in future research. Note: In Figure 1 , the errors of the AR(1) process governing preferences were simulated using 20000 draws with " jt N (0; 1) for all j = 1; :::; N: In Figure 2 , the errors of the AR (1) process governing policy preferences have been simulated using 20000 draws with " jt N (0; 1) for all j = 2; :::; N and " jt N (0; 8) for one policymaker. Figure 7 : RMSE of the public under majority voting with imperfect knowledge of precision of public information.
APPENDIX B: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
First, the e¤ect of varying the persistence of committee members'preferences, j , on the results in Section B. is analyzed. Two alternative values are considered -j = 0:2 and j = 0:8 for all j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1 -compared with the benchmark case of j = 0:5.
The results for j = 0:2 and j = 0:8 are summarized in Tables 1 to 3 where " jt N (0; 1) for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1 and " 1t N (0; 0:1), c 1 = m 1 = 1 and N = 9. The qualitative results are broadly the same as in Figures 3 and 7 . However, it is interesting to note that reducing the persistence of preferences decreases the gain beyond which communication is no longer bene…cial. This is intuitive. When committee members are opaque and ! is used as an estimate of preferences, then the expected squared deviation of this estimate from the true preference of member j is given by (50). This expression is clearly increasing in j : The less persistent preferences are, the better does ! as an estimate of member j 0 s preference. When voting records and minutes are published, then (52), shows that the expected squared deviation of using this information from period t 1 to predict preferences in period t does not depend on j : This is because a decrease j reduces the ability of the public to predict preferences in period t using information from period t 1; but it also decreases the variance of preferences thereby making them more predictable overall. Table 3 : Private sector RMSEs, complete opacity, di¤erent persistence of preferences of committee members the error terms in equations (17) and (23). In the baseline simulations, these variances were both set equal to 1. Two alternative values are considered-2 = 2 = 0:5 and 2 = 2 = 1:5. The results for these alternative parameter speci…cation are shown in Table 4 where " jt N (0; 1) for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1 and " 1t N (0; 0:1), c 1 = m 1 = 1 and N = 9. It can be seen that the qualitative results are broadly the same as in the benchmark case. However, the larger are the variances of the error terms in the preference aggregation equations, the larger is the RMSE of the public in general. This is because the larger are these variances, the worse does ! perform as an estimate of the committee preference. In addition, when voting records and minutes are published, the larger are those variances, the less precise are the private sector estimates of the aggregated committee preferences, (31) Table 4 : E¤ects of changing the variance of the noise in the committee preference aggregation equation
As a further sensitivity analysis, the e¤ect of varying N on the results in Section B. is considered. Two alternative values are considered -N = 3 and N = 15 -compared to the benchmark case of N = 9: The results are summarized in Tables 5 and 6 where c 1 = m 1 = 1 and j = 0:5: In addition, in Table 5 , " jt N (0; 1) for j = 2; 3; :::; N and " 1t N (0; 0:1) whereas in Table 6 , " jt N (0; 1) for j = 1; 2; :::; N + 1: It can be seen that the qualitative results are broadly the same as in Figures 3 and 4 . However, it is interesting to note that reducing the number of committee members increases the di¤erences between majority voting and consensus. This is not surprising. Figure 2 shows that under perfect knowledge, the di¤erence in the RMSE of the public between majority voting and consensus is decreasing in the number of committee members. This is because under a consensus based approach, as the number of committee members increases, policymakers whose preferences are very variable are given less weight. This improves predictability and from Figure 2 it can be seen that as a consequence the di¤erence between the RMSE under consensus and voting decreases as N increases. Finally, the paper also assesses the predictability of preferences, when all committee members have di¤erent variances of preferences, that is 2 ";j 6 = 2 ";k for j 6 = k:The results are summarized in Tables 7 and 8 for N = 9, j = 0:5 and c 1 = m 1 = 1: It is assumed that V ar(" 1t ) = 0:1 and that for j = 2; 3; :::; N + 1, V ar(" jt ) = V ar(" j 1t ) + 0:1: Again, the qualitative results are broadly similar to Figures VI. and VI.. However, the RMSE of the public is now generally smaller, since there is a larger number of committee members with V ar(" jt ) < 1 than in the benchmark case. 
